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This essay blends history, law, and politics in considering the role of legal
imperialism nineteenth-century English extradition law in colonial Hong
Kong. Building upon the pioneering work of Jerome Cohen, this essay
enhances and clarifies our understanding of Chinese legal history and its
continued (and future) influence on Sino-Western relations. By focusing
upon the series of In re Kwok-a-Sing decisions as they traversed courts
from colonial Hong Kong to imperial London, this study analyzes how,
through skilful legal reasoning, the British courts managed to circumvent
laws and assert their political domination in Southeast Asia by repeatedly
refusing to extradite Kwok-a-Sing to China. In the process, the paper
considers how Britain and other Western powers (including the United
States) invariably used law to subordinate China, facilitating a cultural
alienation and humiliation whose effects continue to dog Sino-Western
relations. It accordingly makes legal history relevant to understanding
contemporary international politics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At half past four in the afternoon on October 4, 1870 in the South
China Sea, a party of some twenty Chinese coolies commandeered the
French steamer La Nouvelle Pénélope.1 The men, who had boarded the
vessel four days earlier in Macao alongside three hundred other coolies,
typically remained below deck, safely siphoned off from the crew. That
particular afternoon, however, the seamen, assured of their safety by the
massive barriers erected across the deck to separate European sailor from
Asian laborer, had allowed the coolies above stairs. Even if the blockades
failed to halt a Chinese surge, the cannons stationed at each door in the
barrier would.2 Despite such protections, however, the gang of twenty
coolies “collected near a seaman, who was keeping guard at a barrier that
was placed across the deck, attacked him and threw him overboard.”3
This initial killing complete, the coolies deftly moved to a fore deck where
the ship’s captain strolled unarmed, wholly unaware of the assault. His
ignorance proved fatal, as several coolies attacked and killed him,
stripping the Frenchman of his watch and a substantial sum of currency,
before throwing his body overboard into the depths of the Pacific. 4
Within minutes, the cabal murdered the majority of the remaining
crewmen and forced the few survivors to re-chart the ship’s course from
Peru back towards China. Once La Nouvelle Pénélope had reached
Mainland China the coolies ran the ship aground, where the native

1

Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-A-Sing, (1873–74) 5 L.R.P.C. 181 [hereinafter
Kwok-a-Sing]. See also Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing (19 June 1873),
reprinted in 12 REPORTS OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN
ENGLAND AND IRELAND, at 565–73 (Edward Cox ed., 1875) [hereinafter Cox].
2
Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 181.
3
Id. at 196. See also Cox, supra note 1, at 568–69 (providing an additional account of
how the massacre aboard La Nouvelle Pénélope began, which the official Law Reports
removed).
4
Cox, supra note 1, at 568–69.
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population plundered the vessel.5 Many of the coolies subsequently fled
into Mainland China, where local authorities arrested and tried the men for
their crimes.6
One man, however, departed to British-controlled Hong Kong.
Known as Kwok-a-Sing, the 24-year-old had led the band of coolies in the
raid of La Nouvelle Pénélope. One witness later testified that Kwok-aSing also murdered the captain. 7 In the subsequent legal battle that
traversed courts from the magistracy in Hong Kong to the Privy Council
in London, the British government repeatedly refused to extradite Kwoka-Sing to China on charges of murder and piracy.8 Britain’s refusal to
extradite directly contradicted Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850,
which mandated “the Rendition for Trial to Officers of their own Country
of such Subjects of China as have committed Crimes or Offences against
their own Government, and afterwards taken Refuge in Hongkong.”9 An
appraisal of the ordinance, as well as the acts and treaties governing
nineteenth-century Anglo-Sino relations, reveals the central role of British
legal imperialism in solidifying both political and legal control over China
in the late nineteenth century. This phenomenon becomes more apparent
after analyzing the series of In re Kwok-a-Sing judgments rendered by the
magistracy courts of Hong Kong, the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, and
finally, the British Privy Council.
While skeptics may raise their eyebrows as to the relevance of an
1870 case in understanding China and the modern international legal order,
Jerome Cohen has repeatedly articulated the intrinsic importance of
Chinese legal history in making sense of contemporary Sino-Western
relations. 10 Writing in 1980, he astutely noted, “It is a tendency of
lawyers to be contemporary-minded activists, relevance mongers whose
interest in legal history is limited to its impact upon the present.”11 As C.
5

Id. at 569.
Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 181.
7
Cox, supra note 1, at 568.
8
Id.
9
Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, 1850 (Hong Kong), available at
http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/archive/files/85e96901d33124000dbecaacf916237e.pdf.
10
Jerome A. Cohen, Introduction to ESSAYS ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION 3 (Jerome Alan
Cohen, R. Randle Edwards & Fu-mei Chang Chen eds., 1980) [hereinafter COHEN, ESSAYS
ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION].
11
Id. See also Cohen’s monumental first work, JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1963, at 5–7 (1968) [hereinafter COHEN, THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS], demonstrating the value of Chinese legal history as a means of
understanding fundamental truths about Chinese society that have never wholly vanished.
Cohen deftly proved how ancient Chinese law reinforced Confucian social norms and
disentangled the evolution of the Ch’ing Code between 1644 and 1912; he simultaneously
unearthed a centuries-long seam running between past and present. See also JEROME A.
COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY
STUDY (Princeton University ed. 1974) [hereinafter 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA] (underscoring this
connection between past and present and particularly emphasizing, through documentary
6
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Stephen Hsu remarked, Cohen has taken this understanding of Chinese
legal history beyond the modern international legal order and utilized the
past to “anticipate the pace and direction of its future development.”12
Cohen’s conviction that many of China’s contemporary, conflicted
approaches towards international law developed as a result of the forcible
introduction of Western diplomatic privileges and immunities during the
nineteenth century (and the equally forcible refusal of China to implement
these privileges) finds support in the series of Kwok-a-Sing decisions.13
Equally, just as Cohen maintains that the Peking elite gradually
assimilated to the Western international legal tradition following the
Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, the subtleties of Kwok-a-Sing, while giving
credence to his position, also demonstrate the continued, underlying
reticence of the Chinese to fully engage with the Western legal tradition.14
China’s conflicted attitude towards the West and the international legal
order thus originated during the nineteenth century, persisted in the
twentieth century, and, if history is any indicator, as both Cohen and Hsu
have argued, will continue to dog China’s engagement with the global
political order in the twenty-first century.
In re Kwok-a-Sing thus presents an opportunity to both enhance
and clarify our understanding of Chinese legal history and its continued
(and future) influence on Sino-Western relations. An analysis of the
relevant treaties, acts, and ordinances by the British imperial courts in the
Kwok-a-Sing cases served three important functions. Foremost, it
illustrated how, by skillful legal chicanery, Britain legitimized its
colonization of Hong Kong and domination of the Chinese. By
manipulating the application of the law and relying upon Western legal
and cultural mores in the Kwok-a-Sing decisions, Britain solidified its
political power in the region to the detriment of China. Secondly, the
alternately patronizing and jingoistic language of the various Kwok-a-Sing
decisions, as well as contemporary government correspondence and news
accounts of the cases, further augmented British power in the region by
constructing the Chinese government, laws, and culture as inferior. By
casting the Chinese as gross, bestial savages at empire’s peripheries, the
British justified the implementation of Western law and legal concepts as
a means of bringing order and civility to China.
The imposition of English laws and an English political order in
turn fueled China’s “century of humiliation,” that period of Chinese
history that began with China’s crushing diplomatic defeat following the
evidence gathered in the People’s Republic of China’s infancy, how China’s historic
experiences, both foreign and domestic, influenced contemporary attitudes).
12
C. STEPHEN HSU, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 3 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
13
COHEN, 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA, supra note 11, at 6–7, 933.
14
Id. at 933.
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First Opium War in 1842 and only ended after the expulsion of foreign
powers from mainland China in 1949.15 As Cohen has aptly demonstrated,
this third and most long-lasting consequence stigmatized the Chinese
government and people.16 Indeed, China’s current reticence to engage
fully with the international legal order is directly tied to the “imperialist
exploitation” suffered by the Chinese at the hands of the West during the
nineteenth century.17 The Kwok-a-Sing decisions accordingly demonstrate
how Britain utilized English law and legal decisions in order to
consolidate its own power by rendering China politically, legally, and
culturally inferior. This in turn provoked a lasting legacy of bitterness and
a deep skepticism towards the Western international legal order that
continues to define China’s relationship with the West.

II. HISTORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
Contemporary legal and political thinkers attached great
importance to the Kwok-a-Sing decisions. They featured prominently in
various legal treatises beginning in the 1870s, with Edward Cox’s
voluminous series Reports of Cases in Criminal Law Argued and
Determined in All the Courts in England and Ireland.18 Including the
appeal of Kwok-a-Sing in the series gives credence to the concept of
British legal imperialism, as the case, despite its origin in far-flung
colonial Hong Kong, was appealed to the Privy Council in London, the
center of empire. Its injection into the British court system clearly denotes
that the imperial writ ran large, a fact underscored by Cox’s ample
discussion of the case in a text devoted to the courts of England and its
closest (and arguably most rebellious) colony, Ireland. Another treatise
devoted to the Privy Council, J.J. Beauchamp’s The Jurisprudence of the
Privy Council, recognized Kwok-a-Sing as the standard for all piracy ex
jure gentium cases.19 The following year, F.T. Piggott commented upon

15

Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward Intentional Law—and Our Own, in THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: OBSERVATIONS 108, 110, 284 (J.
Cohen, H. Chieu & D. Johnston eds., 1967) [hereinafter Cohen, Chinese Attitudes].
16
Cohen has posited the idea of stigmatization in Chinese Attitudes. See id. at 111.
17
Id. at 110.
18
Cox, supra note 1, at 565.
19
J.J. BEAUCHAMP, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL: A DIGEST OF ALL THE
DECISIONS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL; A SKETCH OF ITS HISTORY; NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE; A SUMMARY OF ITS PROCEDURES; AND ALSO THREE
APPENDICES 608 (1891) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP, JURISPRUDENCE]. Piracy jure gentium
literally translates to “piracy concerning laws of nations” (thanks to Catherine Sears for
this translation). See also Cox, supra note 1, at 571 (reaffirming the contemporary
definition of piracy jure gentium as “only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery
within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. . . . If the mariners of any ship shall violently
dispossess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself or any of the goods with a
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the history of extra-territorial jurisdiction and briefly discussed how the
case defined extraterritoriality for the British system in Asia in
Extraterritoriality: The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and
Residence in Oriental Countries. 20 In his seminal two-volume The
History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong: from the early period to
1898, J.W. Norton-Kyshe commented upon In re Kwok-a-Sing more than
any other piracy case in the compendium.21 The commentary regarding
the proceedings at the magistracy courts and Supreme Court prove
particularly valuable, as does the commentary on the character of Chief
Justice John Smale, who presided over Kwok-a-Sing in the colony’s
Supreme Court.22
Despite the importance that contemporaries placed upon the
Kwok-a-Sing decisions, interest in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
has seen this once-monumental trial that grappled with such diverse issues
as extradition, habeas corpus, extraterritoriality, and piracy relegated to a
mere footnote of history. In fact by 1925, one scholar queried “Is the
crime of piracy obsolete?” in a law review piece of the same name.23 In
answering with a resounding “Yes,” Edwin Dickinson discussed Kwok-aSing in regards to extradition law and piracy, noting that the Supreme
Court of Hong Kong twice refused to extradite Kwok-a-Sing, despite
piracy’s status as an international crime. 24 Unfortunately, Dickinson
concluded his brief analysis of the Kwok-a-Sing decisions with a mere
note that the Privy Council determined Kwok-a-Sing could stand trial on
the charge of piracy by the law of nations.25 This conclusion is both oversimplified and misleading, as the Privy Council refused to extradite
Kwok-a-Sing, as Dickinson recognized, but also stipulated to his trial in a
British court in Hong Kong. A reappraisal of what occurred is thus
required.
Although other scholarly materials of the twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries briefly mention Kwok-a-Sing, most do so only as a
footnote in law review articles on maritime and piracy cases.26 In fact the
felonious intention in any place where the Lord Admiral hath jurisdiction, this is robbery
and piracy[.]”).
20
Sir FRANCIS TAYLOR PIGGOTT, EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE LAW RELATING TO
CONSULAR JURISDICTION AND TO RESIDENCE IN ORIENTAL COUNTRIES 47–48 (1892).
21
J.W. NORTON-KYSHE, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE LAWS AND COURTS OF HONG KONG: FROM
THE EARLY PERIOD TO 1898 (1898).
22
Id. at 186–87.
23
Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334–60 (Jan.
1925) [hereinafter Dickinson, Crime of Piracy].
24
Id. at 354.
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Guy Manchuk, The Law of the Flag and Maritime Criminal Jurisdiction: A
New Rule to Replace an Outdated, Inconvenient Doctrine, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 221, 231
(Winter 2007); Robert J. Currie & Stephen Coughlan, Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction: Bigger Picture or Smaller Frame?, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 141 (Feb. 2007).
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only recent work to consider Kwok-a-Sing and its larger significance
beyond mere piracy and extradition law is “Kwok-a-Sing, Sir John Smale,
and the Macao Coolie Trade” by Peter Wesley-Smith.27 Wesley-Smith
arguably takes a human rights approach to the cases, focusing not upon
the legal issues, but Chief Justice Smale’s commitment to the liberation of
coolies. Indeed, Wesley-Smith posits that Smale refused Kwok-a-Sing’s
extradition on two occasions due to his belief that the French crew of La
Nouvelle Pénélope forced the coolies aboard the vessel against their will.28
Accordingly, Smale viewed his refusal to extradite or try Kwok-a-Sing for
crimes of murder and piracy as the morally correct decision.29 WesleySmith’s article importantly assesses the larger considerations of Kwok-aSing in contemporary politics from a human rights perspective. Similarly,
an evaluation of the Kwok-a-Sing decisions in regards to British legal
imperialism and its effect on China’s role in the international legal and
political orders would complement Wesley-Smith’s article. Moreover, it
would also fulfill Professor Cohen’s opprobrium that “scholars of
international law can do much more than they already have” to study
diplomatic and political privileges and immunities in the nineteenth
century.30 This work proposes to fill both of these noticeable gaps.

III. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CONSTRUCTING
DISPARITY
The British interest in China began in the late eighteenth century
with the advent of the tea, silk, and opium trades. At a reception held
during Lord Macartney’s first embassy to China in 1792–94, Emperor
Qianlong haughtily remarked to King George III’s ambassador that “our
Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no
product within its own border [and] there [is] therefore no need to import
the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange of our own
produce.”31 Despite the initial discord, the two great empires of East and
West began to trade with one another, though evidence suggests that
China did not view Britain as a true equal to the Middle Kingdom.32
Equal or no, tensions between Britain and China exacerbated during the
early nineteenth century, culminating in the First Opium War in 1839,
which Britain waged following China’s refusal to export opium to British
traders and, equally controversially, China’s confiscation of opium stores
27

Peter Wesley-Smith, Kwok-a-Sing, Sir John Smale, and the Macao Coolie Trade,
H.K.L.J. 124–34 (1993).
28
Id. at 127–28.
29
Id. at 133.
30
COHEN, 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA, supra note 11, at 933.
31
STEVEN TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 5 (2004).
32
Id. at 5–7.
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in British factories in Canton.33 In the words of British Foreign Secretary
Palmerston, the war was meant “to efface an unjust and humiliating act, to
recover the value of certain property plus expenses . . . and almost by and
by to put England’s relations with the Middle Kingdom on a new and
proper footing.”34
Arguably, the Treaty of Nanking, signed by the British and
Chinese governments in 1842 upon the cessation of hostilities, did indeed
place Anglo-Sino relations on “a new and proper footing,” albeit an
inherently controversial footing, with Britain assuming a position of
power that the Qing Emperor Qianlong of some forty years earlier would
not have thought possible. The Chinese, in fact, would suggest that the
Treaty of Nanking was the first of the so-called unequal treaties that
Western powers entered into with China during the nineteenth century.
Aside from the agreement’s longstanding importance of ushering in a
wave of unequal treaties and subordinating Chinese politics, culture, law,
and society to those of its Western counterparts, the favorable trade terms
granted to the British and the cession of Hong Kong Island to Britain
proved the two most immediately significant results of Nanking. The first
article of the treaty stipulated that the Chinese had to abolish the practice
of “compell[ing] the British merchants trading at Canton to deal
exclusively with certain Chinese merchants” at Canton and “all [other]
ports where British merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on
their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please.”35 The
second article allowed “that British subjects, with their families and
establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purposes of carrying on
their mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint, at the cities and
towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai.”36 The
British government would in turn appoint:
Superintendants, or Consular officers, to reside at each of
the above-named cities or towns, to be the medium of
communication between the Chinese authorities and the
said merchants, and to see that the just duties and other
dues of the Chinese Government . . . are duly discharged
by Her Britannic Majesty’s subjects.37
This clause clearly illustrates the growing economic and political presence
that Britain physically exercised in China. Moreover, the terms
underscored that Britain would control all British trade in China, with the
33

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 11 (spoken to Rear Admiral Sir George Elliott).
35
Treaty of Nanking, art. V, U.K.-China, Aug. 29, 1842.
36
Id. art II.
37
Id.
34
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Chinese operating as a mere appendage, informed of trade relations by
British middlemen. Further articles, such as Article X’s provision that all
Chinese ports “be thrown open for the resort of British merchants, [and] a
fair and regular tariff of export and import customs and other dues
[promulgated],” also promised healthful economic terms for Britain.38
Article III of the Treaty of Nanking became by far the most
important article for both Britain’s continued presence in China and the
Kwok-a-Sing affair. Given the increased presence Britain would exercise
economically and politically in China, it proved “obviously necessary and
desirable that British subjects should have some port where at they may
[maintain] and refit their ships when required, and keep stores for that
purpose.”39 Accordingly, “his Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain & Ireland, the Island of Hong-Kong,
to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, her heirs and
successors.”40 With the stroke of a fountain pen, Hong Kong Island
became a Crown Colony. It would become one of the richest cities in the
world and stand as a jewel in the crown of empire until its reversion to
China in 1997. Yet political and legal control served as prerequisites to
amassing such wealth, as an ordered, stable society assured traders and
speculators that their investments would be honored.41 Article III proved
tantamount to ensuring such control, as it asserted that Hong Kong “be
governed by such laws and regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great
Britain & Ireland shall see fit to direct.”42
Importantly, Article III made no stipulation about what type of
government or administrative apparatus Hong Kong would have, but it
clearly ensured that the English common law, in the grand tradition of
Coke and Blackstone, would extend once more beyond the shores of
Albion and enlighten an indigenous outpost, bringing civility and stability
along with it. The explicit reference to law in Article III signifies the
import Britain placed upon the law as a mechanism of building its empire
and consolidating its wealth and power.43 The carte blanche nature of
Article III enabled colonial administrators in Hong Kong to erect courts
and promulgate laws that would define the Kwok-a-Sing decision and
further subordinate China’s role in the international order. The Treaty of
Nanking, therefore, laid the foundation for future Anglo-Sino relations by
placing the Chinese in a politically and legally inferior position.44
38

Id. art. X.
Id. art. III.
40
Id.
41
TSANG, supra note 31, at 19–20.
42
Treaty of Nanking, supra note 35, art. III.
43
A further discussion of this assertion follows in the following section on legal
imperialism; see infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
44
For a further discussion of how Britain subordinated China, see generally Cohen,
Chinese Attitudes, supra note 15, at 284–85. See also WESLEY R. FISHEL, THE END OF
39
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Britain’s role in shaping and molding the Treaty of Nanking as
well as future unequal treaties that ultimately affected the Kwok-a-Sing
cases highlights the role of legal imperialism in Anglo intervention in
nineteenth-century China. The articulation of legal imperialism first
resulted in jurisprudential and political science debates of the mid-to-late
twentieth century, an era that saw the final collapse of the European
imperial order as numerous African, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations
declared their independence. Scholars such as Theodore Becker, Sandra
Burman, Barbara Harrell-Bond, Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kotz, and Martin
Shapiro advanced the concept, though one of the most fluid, clear
discussions of legal imperialism is John Schmidhauser’s “Legal
imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and Post-Colonial Judicial
Systems.”45 Schmidhauser defines the basic theory of legal imperialism as
one where conquering powers universally imposed law upon the
indigenous population in an effort to maintain civil stability and order,
consolidate economic penetration, and ensure that the invocation of
indigenous law by the native population did not threaten the authority and
power of the conqueror.46 Unsurprisingly, legal imperialism is frequently
connoted with European law, whether civil or common, as imbued upon
colonial societies of “the Other.”47
Despite the relatively recent exploration of the theory, case studies
have demonstrated the longevity of its actual practice.48 In regards to
Britain, its incursions into Ireland during the mid-sixteenth century laid
the foundations for all future legal imperialist endeavors employed
throughout its empire between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.49
In Ireland, Britain legitimized its colonization by harkening both to
England’s common law tradition and the canon law of conquest and
warfare as developed by Continental powers and applied to nonEXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 7–11 (1993) (providing a dissection of how Western
powers subordinated China with the terms of the Nanking Treaty).
45
John R. Schmidhauser, Legal Imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and PostColonial Judicial Systems, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 321–34 (July 1992).
46
Id. at 328.
47
“Othering” or defining people as “the Other” began in the writings of GWF Hegel in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to Denys Hays, European
imperialists quickly latched upon the concept as a way of identifying themselves as against
“the Other” non-Europeans (or non-Westerners). See generally DENYS HAY, EUROPE: THE
EMERGENCE OF AN IDEA 122 (2nd ed. 1968) (making “the Other” commensurate with “the
idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European
peoples and cultures”). Edward Said expanded upon this definition in his seminal
Orientalism, in which he suggested, “there is in addition the hegemony of European ideas
about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness.”
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 7 (1979).
48
See, e.g., ALLAN CHRISTELOW, MUSLIM LAW COURTS AND THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE
IN ALGERIA (1985); HANS S. PAWLISCH, SIR JOHN DAVIES AND THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND:
A STUDY IN LEGAL IMPERIALISM (1985).
49
PAWLISCH, supra note 48, at 35.
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Europeans between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries.50 Thus, the
frequent assertion that Ireland was Britain’s “laboratory for empire” is not
without merit.
In a macroscopic sense, Britain’s utilization of other, Western
legal traditions, such as Roman law and canon law, to justify imperialism
illustrated the widespread tendency of European powers to borrow from
various Western legal theories, traditions, and customs when justifying
their incursions into non-European, or in the case of Ireland, “uncivilized,”
territories. Indeed, the series of unequal treaties that the great European
powers, including Britain, France, and Russia, executed with China and
Japan in the nineteenth century demonstrates this reliance on a blended,
Western European legal tradition imposed on the barbarous “Other.”
Britain proved by far the most likely Western nation to unleash its
domestic common law on its colonies and “spheres of influence” while
simultaneously relying upon Roman law to justify the incursions.51 Yet
other Western powers similarly implemented the late medieval/early
modern model of the canon law of warfare and conquest to validate the
destruction and replacement of non-European, indigenous legal societies.52
Such Euro-centric legal views and the universal reliance by Western
powers on the Judeo-Christian legal tradition in effectuating and
legitimizing their conquest of non-European cultures clearly indicates the
assumption from the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until
Treaty of Versailles in 1918 that Western law proved the only law worthy
enough to govern international relations. During this long span of
European legal and political dominance, China negotiated and engaged
with the West. Legal imperialism, therefore, dictated the inferior position
from which China interacted with the Euro-centric legal order. In a more
immediate context, it also illustrated how British courts, from a politically
and legally superior position, manipulated the Kwok-a-Sing cases for
Britain’s own political gain.
Indeed, the vast legal machinery of the British Empire levied itself
upon Kwok-a-Sing in early 1871, thereby beginning a two year drama that
ultimately solidified Britain’s preeminence in China. Records remain
50

Id. at 37. In his study, Pawlisch suggested that the civil law of conquest derived from
Roman law traditions. The Catholic Church built upon such traditions in the thirteenth
century when it in turn established the canon law of warfare and conquest. In turn,
Continental powers between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries developed this
Roman and canon law tradition of warfare and conquest into civil, Continental standards.
The resulting canons held that barbarous and inferior peoples were subject to conquest and
reform. Continental powers then applied such norms to barbarous, uncivilized, nonEuropeans. England modified the civil law standard slightly in arguing that the Irish,
despite their white appearances, were “barbarous and inferior” to the English.
51
John Schmidhauser, Power, Legal Imperialism, and Diplomacy, 23 L. & SOC. REV. 875
(1989).
52
Id.
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unclear, but sometime in late 1870 or early 1871, British authorities
arrested Kwok-a-Sing in Hong Kong as “a suspicious character and a
person dangerous to the peace and good order of the colony.” 53 On
February 7, 1871, Kwok-a-Sing appeared before Charles May, a
magistrate judge in Hong Kong, who duly convicted the coolie for his
actions onboard La Nouvelle Pénélope. 54 In delivering the verdict,
however, May noted a communication that he had received that very
morning from the Chinese government in Canton. 55 The missive
requested that “the rendition of [Kwok-a-Sing] . . . as a subject of China,
who has committed certain crimes and offences against the laws of China
by participating in the murder of a portion of the crew of the French ship
Nouvelle Pénélope.”56
The extradition request and relevant law consulted by May in his
proceedings derived from Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, itself a
product of provisions governing extradition between China and British
Hong Kong in the Treaty of the Bogue, signed on October 8, 1843, and,
later, the Treaty of Tientsin, executed on June 29, 1858.57 This basic
structure of treaties and ordinances, all of which featured favorable terms
for the British, underscored the British Establishment’s imperialist agenda
in China as legitimized by legal means. Indeed, the ordinance and treaties
granted British authorities sole control over extraditions without extending
Chinese officials the opportunity to consult with subjects imprisoned in
Hong Kong. Both contemporary Chinese government officials and
modern British, American, and Chinese scholars have derided the Treaty
of the Bogue and the Treaty of Tientsin as part of the great canon of
unequal treaties that helped to fuel the century of humiliation.58
A cursory glance at the language of the treaties and the ordinance
that became such central features of the Kwok-a-Sing matter indicated the
increasingly imperialist, inequitable tone of the laws. Article IX of the
Treaty of the Bogue ensured the extraditions of both Chinese and British
subjects from the other’s territory if an individual had committed a crime
and taken refuge there.59 As the article made clear,
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if lawless natives of China, having committed crimes or
offences against their own Government, shall flee to Hong
Kong, or to the English ships of war, or English merchant
ships, for refuge, they shall, if discovered by the English
officers, be handed over at once to the Chinese officers for
trial and punishment.60
Similarly, Article IX granted that:
if any soldier or sailor, or any other person, whatever his
caste or country, who is a subject of the Crown of England,
shall, from any cause or on any pretence, desert, fly, or
escape into the Chinese territory, such solider or sailor, or
other person, shall be apprehended and confined by the
Chinese Authorities, and sent to the nearest British
Consular or other Government officer.61
The terms of the treaty thus indicated that a level of reciprocity
applied to citizens of both countries. Yet equally important, the treaties
contained the somewhat suggestive, and indeed patronizing, language of
both class and conquest favored by the British Establishment.62 Certainly,
the treaty provisions, in theory, applied equally to all British subjects. Yet
explicit references to soldiers, sailors, and “others,” coupled with sureties
that one’s “caste” or “country” of birth did not preclude them from the
treaty’s terms, indicated how prominent Britons conceived of conquest as
a class-based, socio-economic right. 63 Their duties to protect British
subjects merely underscored the generally paternalistic air of the treaties.
Yet just fifteen years later, such reciprocal terms had all but
evaporated in the Treaty of Tientsin, which abrogated the Treaty of the
Bogue and its provisions.64 No term within the treaty’s fifty-six articles
discussed the extradition of British fugitives who had fled to China, a
perplexing occurrence given the seeming disadvantage at which it placed
Britain in exercising its legal might.65 Despite this omission, however,
Article XXI stipulated in a masterful display of strident rhetoric that “if
criminals, subjects of China, shall take refuge in Hongkong, or on board
60
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the British ships there, they shall, upon due requisition by the Chinese
authorities, be searched for, and, on proof of their guilt, be delivered up.”66
This provision similarly applied to any Chinese “criminal” who concealed
himself in a house or ship in other British ports in China. 67 The
categorization of the Chinese as criminals even before a court of law
determined their guilt or innocence reflected the disdain of the British
towards the Chinese. 68 The construction of the Chinese as criminals
indicated that traditional legal customs enshrined in the English common
law, such as the presumption of innocence before a showing of one’s guilt,
did not have a place in Britain’s colonial rhetoric in China. Furthermore,
as the treaty language suggested, many British officials feared that Hong
Kong had become a “refuge” for Chinese criminals during the midnineteenth century, thereby contributing to a general degradation of the
Crown Colony’s society. 69 Thus, by providing for the extradition of
criminals, the Victorian propriety that permeated Britain and its colonies
throughout the nineteenth century would remain intact.
By far the most immediate and important law governing the
extradition of Chinese subjects who had fled to Hong Kong was Hong
Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850.70 Ordinance No. 2, promulgated after the
Treaty of the Bogue but before Tientsin, effectively set forth the
procedural mechanisms required for “the rendition for trial to officers of
their own country of such subjects of China as have committed crimes or
offences against their own Government, and afterwards taken refuge in
Hong Kong.”71 In a foreshadowing of the Treaty of Tientsin, Ordinance
No. 2 did not apply to British subjects who committed crimes in violation
of British law and had taken refuge in China, but rather, applied solely to
Chinese subjects who had fled to Hong Kong. To render its dissolute
citizen homeward, Chinese officials had to issue a communication to
any magistrate or Court (other than the Supreme Court)
desiring the arrest of any person being a Chinese subject,
and then within the said colony of Hong Kong, and
alleging that such a person has committed, or is charged
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with having committed any crime or offence against the
laws of China. 72
Upon receipt of the extradition request, a magistrate in Hong
Kong conducted an investigation to determine the nationality of the
accused and whether he had potentially violated any Chinese law. If these
two criteria were fulfilled, the magistrate issued an arrest warrant, and the
accused appeared before the court for an official determination of whether
the individual “is a subject of China, and that there is probable cause for
believing that the said person has committed such crime or offence” in
violation of Chinese laws.73 If so,
it shall and may be lawful for such magistrate or Court to
commit such person for safe custody to prison, and to
direct the gaoler to detain such person in prison until the
said gaoler shall receive some order or orders from the
Governor of Hong Kong relative to the further detention,
discharge, or transmission of such person to the nearest
Chinese authorities.74
Despite the inherent inequality of the treaties, Hong Kong
Ordinance No. 2 indicated that a rigorous standard existed to initiate
extradition proceedings, indicative of the high esteem in which British
authorities held the law as a means of regulating order at home and abroad.
The texts of the treaties suggested that Britain had a vested interest in
depopulating Hong Kong of unwanted, troublesome, and criminal Chinese
but would not reciprocate in extradition by the signing of Tientsin.75
Yet the stringent standards of Ordinance No. 2 reflected the
inferior position from which the Chinese government operated within the
British imperial landscape. The Chinese had to take the first, affirmative
step and issue an arrest warrant to a British judge for an individual they
suspected of criminal acts. The Anglo magistrate, by English—not
Chinese—standards, then determined whether he believed the person was
a Chinese subject and had violated a Chinese law, a daring measure given
that English judges in Hong Kong received no legal training in Chinese
legal standards, as the Privy Council would later note in its Kwok-a-Sing
judgment.76 Only after this initial hearing would British officials consider
arresting the individual and officially charging him with a crime by
repeating the entire process. Such bureaucratic extradition proceedings
72
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were not de rigeur throughout the British system, as Pigott’s
“Extraterritoriality: the law relating to consular jurisdiction and residence
in Oriental countries” highlighted that the Kwok-a-Sing process was
anomalous to Anglo-Oriental relations.77 Thus, between both the Anglocentric proceedings for extradition and the needlessly protracted initial
hearings required to issue an arrest warrant and determine guilt, the British
could assert their dominance in Hong Kong, thereby illustrating to the
Chinese that the United Kingdom, and not the Middle Kingdom,
controlled the fates of Chinese citizens in the territory.

IV. THE FIRST EXTRADITION PROCEEDING
Against this backdrop, Magistrate Charles May applied Ordinance
No. 2 in a most impartial manner and granted China’s request for
extradition. This indicated that British officials in Hong Kong adhered to
the legal framework established by the ordinances and treaties, and did not
abrogate the law in an effort to infuriate Chinese officials and assert
British superiority in the region, regardless of the overall equality of
extradition law. Magistrate May noted that:
upon investigation of the case, . . . there is cause to believe
that the said Defendant is a subject of China, and has
committed the said crimes against the laws of China by
feloniously seizing the said ship at sea, and by murdering
the captain and certain of the crew of the said ship on the
4th October last past at sea.78
Moreover, “after the commission of the said crime [Kwok-a-Sing]
did feloniously seize a boat belonging to the said ship and land at a place
called Pakha, in Chinese territory on the 11th of October.”79 By May’s
estimation, Kwok-a-Sing’s actions clearly warranted extradition to China
in accordance with Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, and he accordingly
commanded the superintendent of the Gaol of Victoria “to receive the said
Defendant into your custody in the said gaol, and there to imprison him . . .
pending the receipt of orders from His Excellency the LieutenantGovernor as to his further disposal.” 80
What happened next changed the nature of In re Kwok-a-Sing
from a typical extradition proceeding to a clash between members of the
Western legal order in both Hong Kong and London that ultimately
resulted in the solidification of British colonial authority in the Crown
77
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colony and East Asia. Immediately after Kwok-a-Sing departed to
Victoria Gaol to await his extradition to China, Kwok-a-Sing’s lawyer
submitted a writ of habeas corpus to discharge the coolie into the Crown
colony. Sir John Smale, the cantankerous Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Hong Kong and passionate advocate for the improved status and
rights of coolies, approved the writ and in the process set off a fire-storm
of opinion throughout the Western world as to the “correctness” of his
action.81 Appointed Attorney General of Hong Kong in 1861 and Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court five years later, Smale seized upon his
elevation to the bench to campaign against the amalgamation of the legal
profession, encroachment of the executive branch, gambling, social abuses,
and most importantly, instances of perceived slavery in Southeast Asia.82
The coolie trade had by this time become “a new form of slavery,”
as the great Western powers, still in need of cheap labor but unable to
maintain slavery, increasingly relied upon colonial agents stationed in
European ports throughout Asia and the subcontinent to coerce the
indigenous population onto Western vessels bound for other destinations
in Asia, Europe, North America, and the Caribbean.83 Abolitionists and
proto-human rights activists deplored the miserable conditions suffered by
coolies, including malnourishment, cramped conditions aboard the ships,
and hard labor in fields, factories, and railroad construction. In fact, the
word “coolie” originated from a Hindi/Urdu word in Britain’s wealthiest
colony of India meaning “day laborer,” while the Chinese equivalent, 苦
力 (“ku-li”), translated to “bitterly hard [use of] strength.”84 As an activist
in stark opposition to the coolie trade, Smale granted the habeas petition,
which, unsurprisingly, the Attorney General of Hong Kong immediately
challenged. In a dramatic irony appealing to a Greek tragedian, Chief
Justice Smale presided over the hearing.
On March 29, 1871, the champion of the coolies delivered his
judgment, a rambling, emotional thirteen page opinion of the crabbedletter variety common in the nineteenth century. 85 Smale used the
81
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opportunity more as a platform to advocate the abolition of the coolie
trade than to resolve legal questions of Empire, arguing that La Nouvelle
Pénélope was a slave ship as proven by depositions. He alternately
deplored the ship and its barracoons as “a slave warehouse, or an incolsure
where slaves are quartered,” and stated that “between twenty and thirty of
the coolies who were on the lower deck were crying, and exclaiming they
had been kidnapped.”86 In a stark departure from the legal questions of
piracy that both Smale and the Privy Council would later consider, the
Chief Justice stridently suggested that in fact the French crew of La
Nouvelle Pénélope was guilty of piracy, not the Chinese coolies who
commandeered the vessel, as the Frenchman held “these poor fellows . . .
piratically as slaves.”87
Given Smale’s personal predisposition against the coolie trade and
slavery, he accordingly tailored his legal arguments to ensure the freedom
of Kwok-a-Sing. In doing so, he carefully crafted a judgment that
undermined the hitherto expanding British power in the colony’s laws and
courts.88 Smale suggested that since the Treaty of the Bogue, which had
laid the groundwork for Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, ceased “to be in force,
the provisions for rendition under it are to cease.”89 Accordingly, “this
construction must be adopted as to the Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, and that
its operation ceased when the Treaty of the Bogue was first suspended and
then absolutely abrogated.”90 Smale astutely noted that the Treaty of
Tientsin of 1858 “differed very much in detail from the Bogue Treaty” as
to its extradition proceedings, as the latter failed to include a provision
dealing with the extradition process.91 The Treaty of the Bogue, of course,
had yielded Ordinance No. 2 to outline extradition criteria, but Smale
reasoned that Ordinance No. 2 was null and void given the abrogation of
the Treaty of the Bogue.92 He accordingly demanded that if the imperial
authorities wanted to engage in extradition, the Hong Kong legislature
first promulgate a new ordinance to render suspects, given Ordinance No.
2 moot status.93
Smale proceeded to turn the remainder of the opinion into a clever
hybrid between legal argument and political manifesto, suggesting that
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murder was not the relevant crime at issue, but rather, “the crime, if
anything, is piracy, and being justiciable here [in Hong Kong], if there be
any crime, there is no ground for giving up the man.”94 Smale’s argument
illustrated a preference for undermining the colonial order by abrogating
the prior ordinance and decrying the named crime as irrelevant. Moreover,
his judgment indicated that Smale did not actually believe a crime had
occurred, as he further wrote:
the prisoner was beyond question under unlawful
coercion . . . [and] it is to me clear that according to
English law a man under unlawful restrain of his personal
liberty at sea, as well as on shore, has a right to take life to
free himself from such constraint on his personal liberty.95
Yet even if a crime, whether murder or piracy, had occurred,
Smale steadfastly refused to extradite Kwok-a-Sing on two additional
grounds. The first, purely legal ground saw the Chief Justice reasoning
that the “right to rendition is confined to crimes committed within the
country demanding it,” but given that that “the crime ‘charged’ was an act
[of murder] committed on the high seas, and also on board what is said to
be a French ship,” China did not have the right to demand extradition
“because the crime, murder, for which rendition is said to be claimed, was
committed at sea, and not in China.”96 Although this resolved the issue in
a purely legal framework, it may well appear as a blow to the Chinese.
Yet later in Smale’s opinion, the Chief Justice hinted at an
additional motivation for refusing to extradite Kwok-a-Sing on the murder
charge. In June 1870, some four months before the incident aboard La
Nouvelle Pénélope, a series of kidnappings involving young children
spread across China. 97 The culprits were assumed to be Catholic
missionaries active in “recruiting” children, frequently with financial
incentives to the children’s families, to the Roman cause. 98 Chinese
officials met with their French counterparts, who had assumed
responsibility and control of all Catholic missionary work in China
following the Second Opium War, in the city of Tientsin on June 19.99 A
vituperative crowd of local Chinese gathered at the meeting and an
eruption of violence ensued, leading to the deaths of thirty to forty local
converts, twenty-one Europeans, and both the French consular officer and
94
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his advisor.100 Relations soured between France and China, and they
became increasingly strained between China and other Western powers
following the Massacre of Tientsin.
Smale, fully aware of this incident, stated in the closing of his
judgment that some sixteen of Kwok-a-Sing’s fellow coolies aboard La
Nouvelle Pénélope had not been so fortunate to escape to Hong Kong, but
rather had fled to China where local officials, “all being under the order of
the French consul at Canton” beheaded their own countrymen for their
actions on La Nouvelle Pénélope.101 Smale quite clearly saw this action as
retribution not only for the murder of the Frenchman aboard La Nouvelle
Pénélope, but also, in a larger sense, as revenge for the massacre of
French and other European officials and missionaries at Tientsin eight
months earlier. In his monumental closing, Smale articulated the
deteriorating political situation between China and the West, his vehement
opposition towards Western motivations in China, and Kwok-a-Sing’s
symbolic role in the drama. “The rendition of the prisoner now before me,
Kwok-a-Sing, has been asked doubtless in order that he may be added as
one more [executed],” the Chief Justice wrote, “and so that one by one,
and at length a great hecatomb of vengeance may be completed on China
land—a lasting monument of the humanity, of the Christianity, of western
civilization.”102 The irony in Smale’s eyes was not the Chinese inability
to provide a fair trial, but rather that the French, who controlled the region
of China to which Kwok-a-Sing faced extradition, would seek retribution,
not justice. Western, civilized, Christian France would instead execute the
coolie out of that basest of human motivations, revenge.
Smale continued his strategy of using a legal ground and
combining it with dire political and societal warnings in his second basis
for refusing extradition. The Chief Justice noted that “it is beyond doubt
that political criminals are not to be given up [and] within the letter of the
treaty [of Tientsin], neither is a Chinese subject to be given up if
justiciable here, e.g., for piracy.”103 By casting Kwok-a-Sing and his band
of coolies as political prisoners, Smale helped to turn the conflict from a
mere legal dispute over the hijacking of a European ship and the murder
of its crew on the high seas to one that involved both political and legal
questions. By making such a move, as the Chief Justice noted later in his
opinion, “I hope that this matter will be, as I believe it will certainly be,
duly investigated in Europe.” 104 Moreover, Smale had turned the
inherently unequal treaties upside down, by reasoning that Article XXI of
the Treaty of Tientsin ensured that Chinese subjects would not face
100
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extradition to China if the crime for which they were charged was also a
crime justiciable in Hong Kong. Murder, and piracy, given its
international status, both constituted crimes within Hong Kong’s
jurisdiction. The wily Chief Justice had thus won his legal victory by
simultaneously decrying the legal imperialist framework instituted by
Britain in China while simultaneously using those same laws and treaties
against the British Establishment.
As important as the resolution of legal questions and their political
affects in Smale’s judgment proved, the Chief Justice’s language and
appeal to liberal ideals also highlighted the subordinate role that China
occupied in world affairs. In addition to his aforementioned criticism of
the West’s position in China, Smale cast the Chinese as “slaves” to
Europeans. 105 In a reinforcement of liberal political philosophies as
espoused by John Locke’s social contract and the French motto liberté,
egalité, fraternité during the eighteenth century, Smale argued that the
“piracy” of the coolie slaves aboard La Nouvelle Pénélope was justifiable,
as “the first law of nature, the right of self-preservation, of liberty equally
with life, which is fully sustained by text-books and cases” demanded that
the coolies revolt.106 He added further legal substance to his compelling
prose and syntax by effectively illustrating how the British had imported
English legal mechanisms, including the common law, depositions, and
testimony before a judge and jury, to assert their dominance over Chinese
defendants in Hong Kong courts. Yet Smale took these hallmarks of
British justice and, just as he had effectively subverted the treaties of the
Bogue and Tientsin in his earlier remarks, suggested that,
however horrible was the scene of contest, and the
carnage on board La Nouvelle Pénélope, the depositions
disclose such acts of enslavement, and of illegal coercion
on the part of the captain and his agents, all the testimony
being ex parte out of the mouths of the coerced or hostile
witnesses for the prosecution, as show that there was no
violence or robbery beyond what was absolutely
necessary to regain liberty.107
This quest for liberty, as demonstrated by English depositions and
testimony, clearly demonstrated “that this prisoner, Kwok-a-Sing, was
guilty of no offence whatever cognizable by English law.”108 Smale,
therefore, radically departed from the Victorian status quo of worshipping
Britain’s expansive empire in his damnation of the Western legal and
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political hegemony in China. Yet he also revealed himself as a standard
Victorian gentleman in his patronizing defense of the coolies’ actions
against their imperial oppressors.

V. A SHOCKWAVE OF REACTION, AND A SECOND ARREST AND
EXTRADITION PROCEEDING
Smale’s important subversion of British and Western legal
principles, in combination with the decision and legal reasoning of his
judgment, was sure to provoke a reaction throughout the Western world.
And so it did. American consular officials and diplomats, undoubtedly
sensitive to the United States’ own tumultuous relationship with slavery
that had ceased a mere six years earlier with the end of the Civil War,
expressed high praise for Smale’s decision. As the United States consular
official D.H. Bailey noted to one Mr. Davis of the State Department in
Washington, D.C., “I have said the decision is remarkable, and it is, first
because in effect it declares that ships employed in the Macao trade are
engaged in piracy; second, that such ships are slave-ships engaged in the
slave trade.”109 Bailey also expressed hope that “if Great Britain sustains
the decision of Chief Justice Smale, the Macao coolie trade, with all its
enormities, will be at an end.”110 Yet Bailey allowed that such a decision
would disrupt an “exceedingly profitable” trade for Britain and the
Western powers, a consequence not welcome by many in the political or
economic realms of the time.111
Equally important in Bailey’s letter are manifestations of the same
patronization towards the coolies and Chinese found in Smale’s judgment,
however favorable both men’s opinions of the Chinese and abolition of
the coolie trade. Indeed, Bailey commented “that the whole coolie trade of
China, at Macao, Hong-Kong, and elsewhere is so full of fraud and all
sorts of iniquity as to make necessary some such startling decision to
arouse Western civilization to a sense of its duty concerning this new and
infamous slave trade.” 112 Bailey’s sentiment touched upon the same
strand and belief inherent with Smale’s judgment that the West, in all of
its enlightened thought and liberal values, owed a duty to the Chinese and
the voiceless coolies to abolish the trade. The Chinese alone could not halt
this problem, the thinking went; it required the intervention of Western
judges and Western politicians, schooled in Hobbesian rhetoric and
Enlightenment thought as espoused by Rousseau, Voltaire, and
Montesquieu. Such a belief system, however well-intended, served as one
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additional element that contributed to the century of humiliation suffered
by China at the hands of the West.
In sharp juxtaposition to the Americans’ delight at Smale’s
decision stood the displeasure of the formidable British Empire. By 1870,
Albion’s seed had spread across the globe, stretching far beyond its early
plantations in Ireland to the salt mines of India, the rainforests of Uganda,
and the silk fields of China. The rainy archipelago in the North Atlantic
whose landmass totaled 84,556 square miles had acquired an empire
spanning some 10,000,000 square miles.113 Over 500 million people owed
allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, nestled away in Victorian luxuries at
Whitehall in London, the pulsating center of the empire upon which the
sun did not set. Also at Whitehall sat the Privy Council, the court of last
resort for Britain and its innumerable colonies. A decision such as that
reached by Sir John Smale in Kwok-a-Sing may have seemed insignificant
if viewed solely within the context of Kwok-a-Sing’s personal battle. But
when considering Smale’s subversive legal reasoning, subliminal
messages, and strident rhetoric, the judgment had the ability to undermine
the foundations of an empire.
Indeed, the imperialist position worsened following Smale’s
judgment. Between Kwok-a-Sing’s arrest on February 7, 1871 and
Smale’s decision on March 29, the French government, as the government
of the slain captain and crew of La Nouvelle Pénélope, sought to extradite
Kwok-a-Sing from British authorities in Hong Kong.114 After Smale’s
judgment, however, and perhaps in testament to its strength, the French
consul abandoned his claim.115 Still committed to seeing justice served,
the Attorney General of Hong Kong seized upon Smale’s remarks that
piracy constituted the only possible charge with which to try Kwok-a-Sing
and sought another arrest warrant charging Kwok-a-Sing with piracy ex
jure gentium in the magistracy court of Charles May. May issued the
warrant and determined that probable cause existed to charge that Kwoka-Sing “piratically and feloniously did make an assault [on] the said ship,
and the apparel and tackle of the said ship, [and] feloniously and violently
did steal, take, and carry away” La Nouvelle Pénélope after “feloniously
and willfully, and of their malice aforethought, kill and murder the said
[crew].”116 May accordingly committed Kwok-a-Sing to the gaol to await
“trial for the said offence at the next Criminal Sessions of the Supreme
Court.”117
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Ironically, Chief Justice Smale presided over the trial on May 10,
1871. Unsurprisingly, he discharged Kwok-a-Sing, but disposed of the
case on a purely legal (and uncharacteristically pithy) basis, not discussing
piracy and its legality at all, but rather holding that the second arrest for
piracy ex jure gentium violated section 6 of the Habeas Corpus Act.118
The act provided that:
[N]o person or persons which shall be delivered or set at
large upon any habeas corpus, shall at any time hereafter
be again imprisoned or committed for the same
offence . . . other than by the legal order and process of
such court wherein he or they shall be bound by
recognizance to appear, or other court having jurisdiction
of the cause.119
Smale suggested that the offence mentioned in both the February
7 and May 10 warrants “is one and the same, and no other.”120 He further
noted that May’s magistracy court did not constitute a real court, but
rather acted as a place of “preliminary inquiry.”121 The Habeas Corpus
Act’s intended “court with jurisdiction” was that of the trial court, indeed,
Chief Justice Smale’s court. Smale, in yet another subversion of the
British justice system, discharged Kwok-a-Sing.

VI. AT THE HEART OF EMPIRE: THE PRIVY COUNCIL RENDERS
JUDGMENT
Smale’s political calculations and subtle legal scheming met a
formidable foe in the Privy Council, which accepted an appeal of the
matter less than two years later. In rendering its decision AttorneyGeneral of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing, the Council proved equally adept
at legal sophistry and artful political subterfuge by reading the law in
terms favorable to Britain and the Western legal order, and constructing
the Chinese as politically, culturally, and legally inferior. The Privy
Council enjoyed a legal and political prominence as the highest court in
the world’s largest empire, hearing cases at its center, which Smale, a
judge at empire’s peripheries, did not. This difference assisted in ensuring
that Kwok-a-Sing became synonymous with British preeminence in China.
The careful progression of the judgment crafted British authority
and law in China as superior. In first determining whether the vexing
118

Id. at 188.
AN ACT FOR THE BETTER SECURING THE LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT, AND FOR PREVENTION
OF IMPRISONMENTS BEYOND THE SEAS, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 6 (1679).
120
Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 189.
121
Id.
119

2011]

CLASHING KINGDOMS, HIDDEN AGENDAS

185

Ordinance No. 2 applied to extradition warrants in Hong Kong despite the
abrogation of the Treaty of the Bogue, the Lords Justices heard
preliminary arguments from both the Attorney General and Kwok-aSing’s counsel. Despite representing “opposing” interests, all of the
counselors were English by birth and education, and ultimately adhered to
and promulgated a legal imperialist agenda. For instance, in a response to
a question posed by Lord Justice Mellish that, “I have an impression that a
Crown colony has not jurisdiction to make such a law,” the Attorney
General of Hong Kong argued that “[Hong Kong] is a Crown colony, and
the Queen can give any powers.”122 This exchange demonstrated how the
Privy Council and Attorney General single-handedly subordinated Hong
Kong and its laws to those of Great Britain and the English common law,
whose writ ran throughout the empire. Colonies had no power in and of
themselves; they depended solely upon London, whose authority was
paramount, for such power.
Even Kwok-a-Sing’s counsel ceased suggesting that Ordinance
No. 2 failed to apply, as Chief Justice Smale would have it, following the
abrogation of the Treaty of the Bogue. Instead, he agreed that a legislative
act passed in the wake of the initial Kwok-a-Sing judgment rendered “the
new Ordinance . . . declaratory—that it declares that the Ordinance of
1850 always did refer to the Treaty of Tientsin.”123 Thus, a legislative
ordinance passed by the Hong Kong Legislature, whose powers derived
from the Crown in London, declared that imperial law, particularly
imperial treaty law, reigned supreme. The concessions and exchanges of
both the legal counselors and the Privy Council merely underscored this
point.
This pattern of subordination, coupled with spectacular jingoistic
syntactical salvos, continued throughout the foundational discussion of
Ordinance No. 2, and proceeded into the resolution of the two issues.124
In arguing that Ordinance No. 2 should not apply to all extradition cases,
such as Kwok-a-Sing’s, the coolie’s counsel suggested that Britain take
pity on his client “where the more humane laws of more civilized nations
differ from those of China. It would be an extraordinary arrangement, if
we gave up persons [to China] not guilty of offences under the English
Law.”125 The attorney’s message was clear: English law was civilized;
Chinese law was not. By extraditing Kwok-a-Sing to China, the British
122
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would effectively cast the coolie to an uncivilized nation of barbarians
incapable of delivering justice. The counsel’s appeal subordinated China
and its “uncivilized” law to that of England, while simultaneously
constructing the Chinese as a legally and culturally primitive society
incapable of executing impartial justice.
Indeed, the Privy Council agreed with this general argument in
resolving the first issue of whether Chinese law provided for the
punishment of a Chinese subject who had murdered a foreigner in foreign
territory. The Privy Council decried as too general Ordinance No. 2’s
clause requiring that an individual be extradited if he had committed
“crimes and offences against the law of China.” 126 In discussing its
reasoning, the Privy Council remarked that, read literally and broadly, the
clause suggested that “every Chinese who had done something which the
law of China treats as a political offence, or who had done anything which
the law of China treats as criminal, though the law of all European
countries treats it as innocent, might be given up.”127 The Privy Council
implied that Chinese law, in addition to its primitive nature, may also have
been too harsh and perhaps even barbaric. Western law clearly departed
from its Chinese counterpart in what it defined as criminal, and likely
maintained more civilized, lenient standards befitting an enlightened
population. The failure the British to protect the average Chinese from
ostensibly harsher punishment in China would prove a shortcoming of not
only British justice, but also duty and responsibility.128 In consideration of
these concerns, and in a further illustration of the supremacy of the
Western legal order, the Council determined that “the words ‘crimes and
offences’ ought to be confined to those ordinary crimes and offenses
which are punishable by the laws of all nations, and which are not peculiar
to the laws of China.”129 This bold implication that “the laws of all
nations” meant the laws of civilized, Western nations effectively excluded
China and condemned it as not comporting with the traditional legal order.
The effect was to add to China’s ever-increasing humiliation.
The assertion did more than subordinate and exclude China in a
widely-published legal opinion; it also enabled the Privy Council “to
consider whether there was evidence that Kwok-a-Sing had been guilty of
crimes against the laws of China within the meaning of the Ordinance”
that the Council had just clarified in condescending detail.130 In reaching
the conclusion that in comparable laws did not exist in China to punish
Chinese subjects for the murder of foreigners in foreign territories, the
126
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Privy Council noted that “up to a comparatively late period, England had
no such laws.”131 The sentiment only added salt to the wound. The Lords
Justice of the Realm had in fact implied that if England, the great civilizer
and benefactor of the law, did not recognize crimes committed by its
subjects upon foreigners abroad until the mid-nineteenth century, a
“peculiar” and “ignorant” nation such as China most certainly would not
have had such laws.132 Accordingly, Chief Justice Smale had correctly
refused to extradite Kwok-a-Sing for murdering the French crew on La
Nouvelle Pénélope. 133 Of course, in the collective eyes of the Privy
Council, Smale’s liberty-littered reasoning proved wholly incorrect, but
the outcome, as affirmed and clarified by the Privy Council, stood as a
testament to the power of the English common law and, along with it, the
British Empire.
The Privy Council employed much of the same jingoistic,
patronizing reasoning in determining the second issue on appeal—whether
Smale incorrectly released Kwok-a-Sing following the arrest warrant for
piracy. In support of their determination that prima facie evidence
suggested “that Kwok-a-Sing had committed an act of piracy jure gentium
to justify his committal for trial for that offence at Hong Kong,” the
Council related the “international” definition of piracy articulated by Sir
Charles Hedges, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty in the monumental
Rex v. Dawson decision. “Piracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy
being a robbery within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty,” Sir Charles had
opined.134 Thus, “if the mariners of any ship shall violently dispossess the
master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself or any of the goods with
a felonious intention in any place where the Lord Admiral hath
jurisdiction, this is robbery and piracy.”135 Notably, the “international”
definition quite clearly had Western origins, as evidenced in the
discussion of the Lord Admiralty’s jurisdiction. In the opinion of their
Lordships, “there was unquestionably evidence that Kwok-a-Sing was a
party to violently dispossessing the master and carrying away the ship
itself and the goods therein.”136 Accordingly, “the only question can be
whether there was sufficient evidence that the act was done with a
felonious, that is piratical, intention,” and the answer to that question
rested entirely within the purview of a jury in Hong Kong.137
The Privy Council’s articulation of why Kwok-a-Sing should not
have been released but rather remained in Hong Kong for trial without the
possibility of extradition to China on the grounds of piracy, an
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international crime, illustrated how the Lords Justices constructed the
Chinese as legally, culturally, and politically inferior to Britain and the
West. Ordinance No. 2 and both the Treaty of the Bogue and the Treaty
of Tientsin, three obvious canons of legal imperialism in China, clearly
provided for the extradition of a Chinese subject who committed a crime
or offence against the laws of China.138 Piracy ex jure gentium was
regarded as an international crime.139 Further, both the governing Treaty
of Tientsin and the abrogated Treaty of the Bogue both contained specific
provisions requiring that Chinese authorities notify British officials of any
piratical acts and “use every endeavour to capture and punish the said
robbers or pirates, and to recover the stolen property.”140 All of these
provisions indicated that Chinese authorities not only recognized piracy as
a crime, but also that the British had explicitly authorized the Chinese to
punish their subjects for acts of piracy. Moreover, extradition ordinances
and treaty provisions required the extradition of Chinese subjects who had
committed acts of piracy, which as an international crime logically
seemed “an offence against the laws of China.”141
Yet extraditing Kwok-a-Sing for piracy proved most undesirable
for the Privy Council, as it represented an encroachment on British
political, naval, economic, and legal authority in the region. More
importantly, as Smale had noted in his first judgment, “[n]o mandarin
would ask for the rendition of a Chinaman for killing a foreign kidnapper
beyond the limits of China in order to punish him. National sympathy
would rather reward him.”142 To avoid these pitfalls, the Privy Council
accordingly distinguished “the acts of piracy jure gentium with which
Kwok-a-Sing was charged . . . from those acts of piracy which they have
before stated to be, in their opinion, within the Ordinance and the
Treaties.” 143 Without offering any reasoning or evidence, the Privy
Council “distinguished” Kwok-a-Sing’s particular brand of piracy as “an
138
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offence against the municipal law of France, to which he was subject at
the time, and not against the municipal law of China.”144 This accordingly
barred China from seeking his extradition through the relevant treaty
provisions and the ordinance. Further, the Privy Council’s opinion created
an insurmountable divide between East and West; effectively, Britain’s
highest court had placed French law and jurisdiction above that of China,
yet determined that a British court in Hong Kong would preside over the
Kwok-a-Sing trial. The Western powers, regardless of their own relations
(nineteenth-century relations between France and Great Britain were
notoriously poor), stood in uniform opposition to China, its politics, laws,
and culture.
In a final blow to China’s legal authority, the Privy Council
remarked that:
if [Kwok-a-Sing] is punishable by the law of China, he is
only so punishable because he has committed an act of
piracy which, jure gentium, is justiciable everywhere . . .
[yet] such an offence is not an offence against the law of
China within the meaning of the Ordinance.145
This final line of reasoning in the piracy issue harkened to the
earlier, nationalist-fueled discussion that “offences against the law of
China” proved too broad and could have ostensibly resulted in the
extradition of too many innocent Chinese who had committed acts that the
barbarous Chinese authorities recognized as crimes and would accordingly
punish, but which the civilized West would not. The Privy Council’s trick
in its resolution of the piracy issue, however, was a subversion of the
reasoning. Although the motives of individual justices remain unclear, the
reasoning and language in the Privy Council’s judgment barring Kwok-aSing’s extradition indicated the influences of paternalism and the
augmentation of British political and legal power. In the subterfuge that
has marked world politics for centuries past and will for centuries future,
the Privy Council achieved its goals.

VII. THE BITTER LEGACY OF DISCORD
Although the Privy Council ordered that Kwok-a-Sing stand trial
for piracy in Hong Kong, whether or not this trial occurred remains a
mystery. Indeed, the various academic references to the case and its slow
progression through the labyrinthine court system of the British Empire
144
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concern themselves with pedantic discussions of the colonial extradition
law.146 Yet as the analysis of the various judgments and contemporary
correspondences indicates, the actual language and text of the cases
highlights the real fears experienced by contemporaries of Kwok-a-Sing in
Hong Kong, mainland China, and London. These were people with
concerns—at least some, legitimate—for their nations’ preeminence in a
global push towards industrialism, the protection of voiceless coolies, and
even their own life and freedom. For the Chinese, such concerns
manifested themselves in the realization that the West used international
law to consolidate power in the hands of the militarily mighty, while
undermining culturally inferior states.147
Kwok-a-Sing thus offers much more than just precedent on
extradition law and piracy ex jure gentium. Rather, it provides a window
into a past world whose events have helped to shape the modern narrative
of China’s relationship with the West. It is only through reading and
understanding what contemporary opinion in nineteenth-century SinoWestern relations was like that we can begin to understand China’s
continued reticence to fully engage with the international order. Although
Dutch East India Company officials apprised the Qing court of the “law of
nations” in the late seventeenth century and such knowledge informed the
signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk with the Russians in 1689, the Chinese
attitude towards international law during the early modern era remained,
in the words of Ann Kent, “at worst, dismissive and, at best,
instrumental.” 148 The Chinese ambivalence towards Western political
powers, and with it international law, grew during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, as Qing officials referred to the British as 夷 (yi, or
“barbarian”) in various diplomatic and legal documents.149 The British in
turn demanded in Article LI of the Treaty of Tientsin that “the character “I”
夷 (“barbarian”) shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her
Britannic Majesty, in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese
authorities, either in the capital or in the provinces.” 150 Ironically,
Britain’s use of a treaty to compel the Chinese to halt their pièce
de résistance further underscored how the West used its law to
disenfranchise undesirable Chinese practices.
China’s traditional
skepticism towards the international legal order of European imperialists
finds further reinforcement in Kent’s contention that China only began to
146
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use international law as a defensive mechanism against “the marauding
West.”151 Measures such as the unequal treaties and stipulations requiring
changes in Chinese practices coalesced with China’s defensive utilization
of international law to yield a deeply ambivalent Chinese attitude towards
the international order during the nineteenth century.
Compounding this general humiliation and skepticism towards
Western powers that dominated nineteenth-century Chinese thought were
suggestions by the most exclusive, Western court in the world that “the
coolies had, by fraud or by threats on the part of other Chinese, been
induced to go to the barracoon, and embark on board the ship against their
will.”152 Indeed, the West justified its role in China by suggesting that the
Chinese had contributed to the enslavement of their own people. The
West—Britain, America, France—had to step in and control the situation
politically, economically, and socially. The law, Western law, provided
the best means to regulate this barbarous society. Paternalism accordingly
served as a further justification for the imposition of inherently unequal
laws, a damning component of nineteenth-century Sino-Western relations
that continues to gnaw at the modern Chinese psyche.153 As Kwok-aSing’s attorney argued before the Privy Council in an appeal to affirm
Smale’s prior opinions and set Kwok-a-Sing free, “the coolies had
reasonable ground for supposing that they were deprived of their liberty
by the captain and crew of the ship; they took possession of the ship, and
used a certain amount of violence with a view to recovering their
liberty.”154 This noble pursuit that pitted the coolies against their French
captors required that the arbiter of justice, the enlightened English high
court, “in estimating the amount of violence that would be reasonably
necessary under those circumstances, . . . apply a different standard in the
case of ignorant Chinese coolies [from] that which would be applied in the
case of Europeans.”155 Such distinctions and differences between the
Chinese and the West as articulated by Europeans fueled Chinese
contempt for the West.
The legacy of this scorn continues to pervade the Chinese
conscience and tinge the relationship between East and West more than
140 years later.156 China’s ambivalence towards international law found
support in the Communist Party assertion in 1957 that “International law
is one of the instruments of settling international problems. . . . However,
if this instrument is not advantageous to our country . . . we will not use it
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and should create a new instrument to replace it.”157 Such a deeply
pragmatic, albeit skeptical, attitude towards engagement with the West has
found multiple instances of support since the 1950s. Indeed, China’s
frequent refusal to support United Nations-led interventions reflects, to
many observers, Jerome Cohen and Allen Carlson among them, China’s
concerns regarding state sovereignty.158 Cohen has even gone so far as to
suggest that, in light of the West’s manipulation of the law to disinherit
China of its traditional glory, “[i]s it any wonder that Chinese leaders
maintain a ‘vivid sense of outrage’ and manifest an almost obsessive
concern with vindicating and preserving national sovereignty?”159
Issues of sovereignty aside, Chinese film director Chen Shizheng
suggested at the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing that “we Chinese
carry the burden of our history with us and the question of Western
humiliation is always unconsciously inside us. Thus we feel sensitive to
any kind of slight and often have a very sharp reaction to perceived unfair
treatment or injustices.” 160 The fact that China has demonstrated a
progressive engagement with the West since the late 1980s, participating
in environmental and economic summits and even joining the World
Trade Organization in 2001, indicates a “profound transformation” in
Chinese thought.161 Nonetheless, even scholars as optimistic as James Li
Zhaojie allow that the old international regime and its antecedents in the
nineteenth century affected China’s mentality as “victim-minded
underdog.”162 As Chen allowed, “on an emotional level we cannot help
but associate treatment in the present with past injuries, defeats, invasions,
and occupations by foreigners.”163 It is this continued association of past
injustices at the hands of the West’s legal and political order that continue
to affect Sino-Western relations. As Peter Hays Gries wrote in China’s
New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, “[t]he West is central
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to the construction of China’s identity today; it has become China’s alter
ego.”164
The construction of that identity began with the first Western
incursions into China by Dutch traders during the seventeenth century and
was thoroughly honed by the British in their ruthless pursuit of economic
and political self-interest during the nineteenth century.165 In this context,
the Kwok-a-Sing decisions serve as but one minute portion of a complex,
multi-national tableau of clashing empires and ideologies. Yet in Kwok-aSing the vast array of laws, treaties, political concerns, human rights issues,
and the omnipresent jockeying for global power that characterize the
international political order, both then and now, all appeared. Kwok-aSing provides, therefore, a valuable paradigm from which to assess
modern issues of Chinese reticence towards the Western political and
legal orders. A thorough assessment of the legal and political framework
implemented by British authorities in Kwok-a-Sing proves instrumental to
understanding why China remains skeptical and derisive towards Western
influence in Chinese affairs. The language of the treaties, ordinances, and
opinion in Kwok-a-Sing further underscore a paternalistic tone that has not
wholly left the Western-Sino debate regarding the proper treatment of
individuals. As China looks towards a new, leading role in the
international order in this century, it would behoove Western politicians,
policymakers, businesspeople, lawyers, and academics to examine the
West’s past experience with China. For it is this past that China knows all
too well, and the West all too little.
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